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DONNA SHESTOWSKY*
Since its inception in 1980, the summary jury trial (SJT), a non-binding
abbreviated jury trial used as a basis for settlement negotiations, has received
significant attention in scholarly journals and in the courts.' As the only
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure that relies on public
participation through the use of a jury, SJTs have been heralded as the best
mechanism for predicting jury verdicts and for promoting settlement in cases
that would otherwise be decided by a traditional jury. 2 Some commentators
have extolled the virtues of SJTs; others have criticized them on both
theoretical and practical grounds. Despite the extent of scholarly evaluation,
however, very little analysis has drawn from the rich psychological research
on juries.
The absence of this analytical focus is surprising given that SJTs are a
form of jury trial, and legal scholars have evaluated traditional jury trials in
light of psychological jury research on innumerable occasions.3 In an attempt
* M.S. (Psychology), Yale University; Ph.D. Candidate (Psychology), Stanford
University; J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School. The author wishes to thank Deborah
Hensler, Lee Ross, Leonard Horowitz, Danny Oppenheimer, Scott Kush and Shawn
Kerrigan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The contributions of
research assistants Chien-Ying Yu and Rusty Selmont are also acknowledged with
appreciation. Correspondence concerning this Article may be sent to Donna Shestowsky,
Department of Psychology, Building 420, Jordan Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA
94305-2130. Electronic mail may be sent to donna@psych.stanford.edu.
I See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury Determined Settlements, and Summary Jury
Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 95-103 (1991).
2 In fact, Judge Lambros, the creator of SJTs, has emphasized that "[t]he strength of
the summary jury trial is derived from the ability to use the SJT to predict or forecast a
jury outcome which can then be used as an aid to settlement." Thomas D. Lambros, The
Summary Jury Trial-Ending the Guessing Game: An Objective Means of Case
Evaluation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 621, 622 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 63, 75-76
(1993) (reviewing psychological research suggesting criteria that courts could use to
identify cases in which jury discrimination is most likely to affect the verdict); Jennifer
K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for
Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 167-89 (2002) (considering the implications of
psychological research for punitive damages reform); Roselle L. Wissler et al.,
Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and
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to help fill the void in the literature, this Article provides a critical analysis of
SJTs from a psychological perspective, with substantial emphasis on jury
psychology. This Article concludes that the SJT is a promising ADR tool, but
that it. falls significantly short of its potential. By implementing insights
drawn from psychological research, the effectiveness of this form of ADR
can be considerably enhanced. This Article should serve as a useful starting
point for establishing procedures that comport with the wisdom derived from
empirical findings.4
Part I of this Article will describe SJTs, while Part II will provide a
general overview of psychological research which, it will be argued, suggests
that SJTs do not meet their potential with respect to predicting traditional
jury decisions. Part III will analyze how summary jurors are treated, drawing
parallels to the treatment of participants of psychological research, and offer
some ideas for improving this aspect of SJTs. Finally, Part IV will
recommend more empirical research on SJTs, and conclude by advising SJT
administrators to adhere to appropriate ethical norms in order to protect the
reputation of the legal system.
I. WHAT IS A SUMMARY JURY TRIAL?
Summary jury trials are essentially "non-binding abbreviated trials by
mock jurors who are chosen from the jury pool" at the behest of the court. 5
Judge Thomas Lambros of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio created this procedure in 1980 in "response to burgeoning court
Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712 (2000) (discussing research on the
effectiveness of alternative forms of jury instructions and proposed trial procedures for
ameliorating juror compliance with these instructions); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where
is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual
Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REv. 357, 367-84 (1999) (reviewing cases which used
jury research on sexual harassment issues to improve sexual harassment trials).
4 There is plenty of opportunity for continued experimentation on SJTs:
The plans of many districts indicate that summary jury trials. . . are available
as ADR mechanisms, but do not specify procedures or rules for conducting these
processes .... Because many plans do not include procedures for summary jury
trials, judicial officials who preside over such trials presumably have discretion to
devise their own procedures, perhaps in consultation with the parties.
John Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity be Better?, 34 DUQ. L. REv.
245, 251 (1996).
5 ROBERT B. MCKINNEY & EDITH B. PRiMM, GEORGIA PROCEDURE. § 9:11 (2002).
SJTs substantially deviate from the conventional trial format in that usually no sworn
testimony is taken from witnesses and counsel are expected to submit the relevant
exhibits, all of which must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5A 0.
JUR. 3d, Alternative Disp. Resol. § 27 (1997).
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dockets."' 6 Since then, thirty-nine federal district courts have approved their
use, and Congress has authorized them in the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990.7 They are most commonly used for high-stakes cases that would likely
result in long and protracted jury trials if they were litigated. Most courts that
offer SJTs follow Lambros' formulation, in which a judge suggests or
requires their use for parties who cannot agree on settlement terms during the
course of pretrial conferences. 8
The verdicts that summary jurors recommend are intended to provide the
starting point for settlement negotiations. 9 Because every case is unique,
6 Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77
JUDICATURE 6, 6 (1993).
7 Maull, supra note 4, at 250; Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471
(2002). "Before this explicit statutory authorization, Federal Rules 1, 16, and 39(c)
implicitly authorized courts to conduct such trials with jurors who rendered advisory
verdicts that facilitated dispute resolution." Lambros, supra note 6, at 7; see also
Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Federal Court ADR: A Practitioner's Update, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 7, 7 (1996) (noting that although more than half the
districts now authorize judges to employ SJTs, most courts report only one or two cases
per year).
8 See Charles F. Webber, Comment, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by the
Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (1989); Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory
Summary Jury Trial Back on the Docket: Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial
Authority, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1069, 1085 (1995). "The Sixth and Seventh Circuits
accept only voluntary SJT.. .[,] [b]ut in an effort to deal with burgeoning caseloads,
some federal courts have approved compulsory SJT use" that is mandated without the
parties' mutual agreement. Id. With respect to whether or not SJTs should be binding,
Lambros argues:
When it is clear that the parties have no interest whatsoever in settling their
differences, and only a final adjudication will ultimately resolve the case, neither the
summary jury trial nor any other means of judicially sponsored mediation will
induce a settlement. However, where the trial court, in its discretion, believes that
there is sufficient interest in a settlement or that one of the parties' view of the facts
or the law is so inconsistent with the likely findings of a jury that a summary jury
trial may facilitate settlement discussions, it is properly within that court's discretion
to order a summary jury trial, If negotiations fail after the summary jury trial, the
case may proceed to trial.
Lambros, supra note 6, at 7-8.
9 Lambros, supra note 6, at 7-8. One legal commentator provides an example:
Under such a program, if plaintiffs written settlement demand was in the
amount of $200,000 and the summary jury trial resulted in a verdict in the amount of
$550,000, the defendant would have the option to elect to accept plaintiff's demand
of $200,000 to settle the case. Similarly, if the summary jury trial resulted in a
verdict for the defendant and defendant's written offer was $50,000, plaintiff would
have the option of accepting defendant's offer of $50,000 to settle the case.
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judges are encouraged, to mold the summary jury process to fit the unique
contours and individual needs of a particular case. 10 Generally, a much-
abbreviated voir dire is conducted, with both sides making limited for-cause
and peremptory challenges."l In a typical SJT, a "judge or magistrate
presides over the trial .... [and] [p]rincipals with authority to settle the case
attend."'12 Each lawyer presents a summary of the case to the jury, including
opening and closing statements and summaries of witness testimony.
Normally, live witness testimony is not presented. 13
After the evidence has been presented, the judge gives the jury
abbreviated instructions on the law. 14 Subsequently, the summary jurors
either deliver a consensus verdict and damage recommendations or, if the
judge prefers, they render verdicts and damage ,recommendations
individually. 15 The parties and their counsel then have an opportunity to
discuss this verdict with the jurors. 16 If the parties cannot settle their dispute
following the verdict, the result of the SJT is not admissible in court. 17
The primary goal of the SJT is to promote settlement. It was designed for
cases in which the parties have difficulty reaching a settlement because each
Terrance M. Miller, ADR Innovation... Summary Jury Trial-Arbitration by a Jury
of Your Peers, INSIDE LITIG., Dec. 1996, at 7 (1996). Of course, parties also retain
the right to withdraw from negotiations or change demands or offers.
10 See Lambros, supra note 6, at 7.
11 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problems of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1199, 1211 (2000). Following the
Lambros model, usually ten potential jurors are obtained from the regular venire for a
modified and abbreviated voir dire. Webber, supra note 8, at 1497. "Each juror fills out a
questionnaire, which is given to the attorneys before examination. The judge allows each
attorney two challenges to the venire, resulting in a six-member jury." Id.
12 Robert Benham & Ansley Boyd Barton, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Ancient
Models Provide Modern Inspiration, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 650 (1996).
13 Lambros, supra note 6, at 7. If the lawyer chooses to present witness testimony
rather than oral argument, he or she should refrain from audio- or video- taping the
testimony because if the witness later testifies at trial, the recording could be discoverable
by the other side on the theory that it is a prior statement of the witness. Thomas R.
Mulroy, Jr. & Andrea B. Friedlander, Trial Techniques: A Discussion of Summary Jury
Trials andthe Use of Mock Juries, 24 TORT & INS. L. J. 563, 568 n.18 (1989).
14 Webber, supra note 8, at 1497.
15 Id; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 781, 802 n.74 (1998) (explaining that, although SJT verdicts are non-binding,
jurors are often led to believe the contrary).
16 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS § 2.61 (2d ed.
1997).
17 Employment Coordinator, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Private "Trials":
SUMMARY JURY TRIALS (2001) [hereinafter Private Trials].
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party either overestimates the strength of his or her own case or
underestimates the strength of the other party's case.1 8 Summary jury trials
"reduce this 'mutual optimism' by providing the parties with more
information about the strength of their cases before proceeding to trial." 19
They help to combat parties' naYve realism-their tendency to overestimate
the likelihood that unbiased "neutrals" such as jurors will share their
viewpoint on the case, and not be persuaded by the apparent "irrationality" of
the other party.20 By listening to the reactions of the summary jurors, the
parties can learn about how such unbiased neutrals do in fact perceive the
case, and can greatly benefit from discovering any variability in such
perceptions. Moreover, SJTs can promote settlement by helping the parties
converge in their estimates of the size of jury award that would come about if
their case went to trial. 2 1
Another feature of SJTs is that they produce the kind of tensions that are
present in traditional jury trials. According to Lambros, this tension has two
advantages: first, the SJT acts as a dress rehearsal for the real jury trial, and
second, the shadow of an approaching trial intensifies the parties' efforts
toward settlement. Because the parties are required to attend the SJT, "the
procedure is particularly effective where the legal labyrinth begins to tax the
patience of the litigants before the 11 th hour arrives and provides the parties
with a sense of reality while there is still time to do something about it."' 22 In
addition, SJTs tend to clarify issues at an earlier stage in the dispute
18 Webber, supra note 8, at 1496.
19 1d.
20 For a detailed elaboration of the na'fve realism concept, see Lee Ross & Andrew
Ward, Na've Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and
Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
21 See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366,
371 (1986).
The summary jury trial reduces the gap between the parties' perceived
probabilities of the outcome at trial by giving them information (in the form of the
summary jury's reactions to the case) that should cause them to adjust their
perceptions. Because the information is available to both parties, it should help each
to get closer to the true odds, which will usually be somewhere in between the
parties' estimates. The summary jury trial may also help the parties converge in their
estimates of the size of the judgment if the case goes to trial ... Narrowing this
divergence will make a settlement more likely.
Id.
22 Lambros, supra note 6, at 7. Naturally, parties can always "do something" about
it-they can settle at any time.
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resolution process, thereby presumably making any subsequent trial more
efficient. 23
Summary jury trials have several advantages over traditional jury trials.
One benefit is that they tend to cost the parties less than a traditional trial
would.24 These relative savings arise because SJTs "demand less lawyer
time-both in and outside the courtroom-and do not involve the expense of
paying expert witness fees. ''25 In fact, because the information presented to
the jury is in summary form, SJTs often last less than a day. 26 Another
benefit of SJTs is that because they are a means to settlement agreement,
they can assist litigants in avoiding the "win/lose" outcomes that are typical
in traditional litigation and help them to achieve a mutually beneficial
solution instead. 27 This feature can help preserve the relationship between the
parties.
Summary jury trials appear to be a successful means of promoting
settlement. Studies suggest that approximately ninety-five percent of cases
tried before summary juries end up settling.28 Some critics have claimed that
this figure is somewhat misleading because studies show that, in fact, over
ninety percent of all cases settle before trial. 29 However, the sole
experimental study on SJTs published to-date suggests that they may in fact
lead to a higher settlement rate than cases that do not undergo ADR. 30 This
study randomly assigned civil cases filed in 1993 in Ramsey County,
Minnesota, to either a control group of cases that were designated as
ineligible for ADR, an experimental group of cases eligible for mediation-
23 Id.
24 Except in cases where they fail to help the parties reach a settlement, and
consequently, form an "additional layer of expense" beyond the costs of a traditional jury
trial. See Ann E. Woodley, Strengthening the Summary Jury Trial: A Proposal to
Increase Its Effectiveness and Encourage Uniformity in Its Use, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 541, 571 (1997).
25 Mulroy & Friedlander, supra note 13, at 564. One study disclosed that over
eighty-two percent of the SJT cases in the Northern District of Ohio were resolved more
quickly than the average of comparable cases that were not assigned to SJTs. Lambros,
supra note 6, at 8.
26 Lambros, supra note 6, at 8.
2 7 Id.
28 Private Trials, supra note 17.
29 See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reform, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1989) (finding that "[a]bout ninety-
five percent of the civil cases filed in federal courts are terminated before trial").
30 John S. Connolly, A Dose of Social Science: Support for the Use of Summary Jury
Trials as a Form of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1419,
1430 (1999).
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arbitration ("med-arb"), 31 or a second experimental group of cases eligible
for a SJT. 32 Cases were selected "from the major civil cases that were filed
and placed on a 'standard' case track."'33 Results of the study indicated that
4.1% of the med-arb cases and 10% of the control cases went to full trial,
whereas only 3.6% of SJT cases did so. 34 Although this study did not
provide evidence that SJTs produce significantly higher settlement rates than
med-arb, the settlement rates for cases undergoing SJTs did appear higher
than rates for cases that did not undergo ADR at all.
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
A. Predicting Traditional Jury Trial Decisions
Legal academics have suggested that SJTs encourage settlement
primarily because of their signature feature: the use of a jury. As one such
commentator has argued, "[t]he theory underlying the [SJT] is that parties,
following pre-trial discovery and conference, will be more inclined to settle
their dispute if they receive a jury evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses
of their claims and defenses." 35 Litigants are presumably more likely to
accept the case valuations of summary jurors than those of their attorneys or
qualified neutrals. 36 Those who advocate SJTs claim that the use of a
summary jury allows the litigants to actually predict how a traditional jury
would decide their case.3 7 One study found that sixty-four percent of state
31 Id. at 1430-31. "Med-Arb" is "a hybrid of mediation and arbitration in which the
parties initially mediate their disputes; but if they reach impasse, they arbitrate the
deadlocked issues." Id. at 1423 n.14.
32 Id at 1430-31.
33 Id. ("Case assignment continued until roughly 100 cases were assigned to each
group-control, mediation/arbitration, or SJT. Cases were not allowed out of the [group]
to which they were assigned.").
3 4 Id. at 1431.
35 Cole, supra note 11, at 1210 (emphasis added).
36 Connolly, supra note 30, at 1448. The intuition among lawyers is that "[p]laintiffs
accept jury verdicts better than [they accept] advice of counsel." Anne-Marie Thompson,
Summary Jury Trials are Being used to Produce Economical Justice by Stimulating More
Settlements, P. LAW., Nov./Dec., at 31, 32 (1996).
37 The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution,
103 F.R.D. 461, 463 (1984) [hereinafter Alternative Methods]; see also Irving R.
Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv, 1, 14-15 (1990); William D. Underwood, Divergence in
the Age of Cost and Delay Reduction: The Texas Experience with Federal Civil Justice
Reform, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 261, 313 (1994). As Lambros has stated:
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court lawyers and fifty-three percent of federal court lawyers believe that SJT
verdicts reflect actual traditional trial outcomes. 38  In fact, some
commentators have gone as far as to claim that the verdict of a summary jury
can serve as a "crystal ball" that parties can rely on to "predict, with a
reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do" at trial for that case.39
Some legal practitioners and academics, however, have questioned the
effectiveness of the SJT as a "predictor." As Robert Bradford has pointed
out, several real-life examples cast doubt on the SJT's ability to predict
traditional jury trial outcomes:
[In a case from Minnesota] two panels of six people each heard the same
SJT presentation. One panel found for the defendants; the second panel
returned a $2.292 million "verdict" for the plaintiff. Similarly, in [a case
that went before the Sixth Circuit], an SJT resulted in a $200,000 "verdict"
for the plaintiff. The regular jury at trial returned a verdict in the amount of
$1.7 million.40
Others argue that SJTs are problematic as predictors because of "the
abbreviated nature of the parties' presentations. '41 Problems might also arise
when "strategizing" lawyers withhold critical information during the SJT in
order to retain an element of surprise for the real trial.42 Moreover, because
objections are generally not allowed, summary juries may hear evidence that
would be inadmissible at trial.43 Studies have not yet experimentally
Every time a case is prepared for litigation, a trial lawyer is faced with the
imponderable task of attempting to predict the outcome of a jury trial. Clients desire
to know what the outcome will be prior to trial and, thus, an attorney must venture a
guess to determine whether to advise their clients to settle or to risk a trial. The
evaluation process was too subjective. As professionals, we have been in need of
something more objective for measuring outcomes... . The summary jury trial was
intended as a step towards achieving objectivity in case evaluation.
Lambros, supra note 2, at 621. Summary jury trials were developed to help counsel more
accurately predict the outcome or values of cases before the case went to trial. Id. at 622.
38 See James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A
Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 213, 228 (1989), cited in In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 166 F.R.D. 391, 394
(S.D. Ohio 1996).
39 Alternative Methods, supra note 37, at 463.
40 Robert W. Bradford, Jr., The Mini-Trial and Summary Jury Trial, 52 ALA. LAW.
150, 155 (1991).
41 Mulroy & Friedlander, supra note 13, at 565.
42 See Maria Moore, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Too Hasty a Solution to the
Growing Problem of Judicial Inefficiency?, 14 REv. LITIG. 495, 498 (1995).
43 See id.
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confirmed the magnitude of these potential problems by examining how SJT
results compare to traditional jury outcomes. 44 It is reasonable to assume,
however, that summary juries will offer insight about the responses -to be
expected from a traditional jury.only insofar as the evidence presented at a
SJT is truly representative of what would-be used at trial.
Beyond these anecdotes and intuitions about differences with respect to
presentation and matters of evidence, however, jury psychology research
suggests that certain structural features of SJTs hinder their ability to reliably
predict traditional jury decisions. Three structural features are of particular
relevance: small sample size, the absence of group deliberation, and non-
correspondent jury size. Fortunately, each of these features can be modified.
This Part will review each feature in turn and will discuss how courts that use
SJTs can apply psychological research to develop ones that better
approximate traditional juries, and therefore, better predict jury outcomes.
B. The Need for Multiple Summary Juries
One problematic aspect of SJTs is that they often rely on the opinions of
a single summary jury to predict what another single traditional jury would
decide.45 Using a single observation as a basis for understanding a
phenomenon is akin to relying on a case study or, in other words, a sample of
one. The perils of using case studies for generalization or prediction have
been well identified by research psychologists. 46 Quite simply, in order to
make a reliable prediction, data from multiple samples from the same
representative population must be examined. Beyond the issue of reliable
predictions, another benefit of using multiple summary juries is that doing so
provides a hint as to the variability in perceptions on the case. The level of
44 As per Westlaw and Internet searches, ending in May 2002.
45 Very few judges report using multiple panels. "Judge Lambros used two jury
panels to ascertain areas of consistency in the verdicts and to determine whether asbestos
cases would follow a particular pattern." Molly M. McNamara, Summary Jury Trials: Is
There Authority for Federal Judges to Impanel Summary Jurors?, 27 VAL. U. L. REV.
461, 469 n.60 (1993) (citing Judicial Conference of the Sixth Circuit of the United States,
The Summary Jury Trial, May 16, 1985, app. A addendum I at 5). "Judge Enslen used
two panels of six jurors in the groundwater contamination SJT." Id. (citing Hon. Richard
A. Enslen, Federal Judge Says Summary Jury Trials Can Help Settlement in Toxic Tort
Cases, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVE 105 (Martha
A. Matthews ed., 1990)).
46 See, e.g., CAROLE WADE & CAROL TAVRIS, PSYCHOLOGY 40 (1998); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL.
105-10 (1971).
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variability in jury opinions about liability and damage awards can provide the
litigants with an important indicator about the risk involved in going to trial.
Moreover, psychological research on jury decisions offers another reason
for not relying on a single summary jury to predict a traditional trial
outcome: studies have shown that when evidence in a case is equivocal, the
unique personalities and biases of the jurors deciding the case are especially
likely to impact jury outcomes.47 When the strength of evidence in a case is
balanced across both sides of the dispute, "extralegal" factors such as biases
become more heuristically useful in the decision-making process and are
therefore likely to impact jury decisions.48 The problem with SJTs is that
parties who participate in one may not know in advance of the procedure that
the evidence in their case is equivocal. Thus, the parties may end up with a
summary jury verdict that they believe reflects the relative weight of the
evidence when, in fact, it is more a function of the personal attributes of
those who happen to have served on that summary jury. The parties in such
cases would not know that the weight of the evidence favors both parties
about equally, and the settlement terms might (unjustly) reflect this error.
A modest and practical solution to the problems associated with relying
on data from a single summary jury would be to use multiple summary juries
for each case. Although it might not be feasible to require the number of
juries that a research psychologist would use for the purposes of conducting
publishable research, one could nevertheless achieve more reliable data for a
SJT by assembling the equivalent of eight or nine juries worth of individuals
to attend the same SJT sessions, and then grouping them into separate juries
for the purposes of deliberations. By conducting statistical analyses on the
data obtained from such a series of jury panels, a research psychologist,
statistician or similar expert could provide a mathematical estimate of the
expected outcome on the issues of liability and damages. 49 This procedure
would reduce the risk that the parties will rest their settlement decisions on
data from an aberrational summary jury. Moreover, using multiple panels
might even elevate the settlement rate following SJTs, since, for example, it
would be harder for reluctant parties to rationalize seven out of eight
47 For a good discussion on this point, see generally Robert J. MacCoun, The
Emergence of Extralegal Bias During Jury Deliberation, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 303
(1990).
48 They are "extralegal" in that they are based on factors which are logically
irrelevant to the determination of guilt or liability in the cases in which they are
manipulated. Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and
Extralegal Factors in Jurors'Decisions, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 423, 430-31 (1986).
49 Robert Gordon, Summary Jury Trial: The Key to Unlocking Litigation Gridlock, 4
No. 10 MED. LEGAL ASPECTS BREAST IMPLANTS 3, at 4 (1996).
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summary jury verdicts against them than it would be for them to ignore a
single unfavorable summary verdict.
C. The Need for Group Deliberation
Another problem with summary juries arises when judges ask jurors to
render verdicts and damage recommendations individually rather than as a
group that has reached a consensus. 50 This approach seems to reflect the
belief that groups are merely a sum of their parts and, consequently, that the
verdict of a traditional jury can be predicted from the individual attitudes of
summary jurors. Although some research suggests that there can be a strong
relationship between the individual-level pre-deliberation distribution of
verdict preferences and a deliberating jury's verdict,51 several decades of
research on jury decision-making make clear the folly of relying solely on
individual opinions to predict group verdicts. 52 As one psychologist stated
50 Webber, supra note 8, at 1497; see also AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D PRAc. AIDS § 654
(2001) (outlining that jurors can return "either a consensus verdict or a special verdict
consisting of an anonymous statement of each juror's findings on liability and/or
damages" in asbestos liability suits).
51 HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487-90 (1966)
(demonstrating that the first ballot is a strong predictor of jury verdicts); David Schkade
et al., Empirical Study: Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1139, 1153 (2000) (demonstrating that "[w]hen a majority of juror judgments (i.e.
[sic], four or more) are 0, the jury verdict is virtually certain to itself be 0. When a
majority of jurors have non-zero judgments, the jury verdict is virtually certain not to be
0. Finally, if the jury is evenly split, the chance of a 0 verdict is about 50-50.").
52 See, e.g., CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 208-09 (1994) (discussing situations in which individual
case evaluations differ from group verdicts); Richard R. Izzett & Walter Leginski, Group
Discussion and the Influence of Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting,
93 J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 271, 275-76 (1974) (finding that individual mock jurors assigned
"unattractive" defendants a significantly more lenient sentence than they did before the
group discussion); Schkade, supra note 51 (concluding, from a study of over 3000 adults
deliberating in mock juries, that the median dollar awards of a group of individuals prior
to deliberation are poor predictors of that group's collective verdict following
deliberations); Donna Shestowsky, Duane T. Wegener & Leandre R. Fabrigar, Need for
Cognition and Interpersonal Influence: Individual Differences in Impact on Dyadic
Decisions, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1317, 1322 (1998) (finding that the
individual-level predeliberation opinions of low need for cognition individuals did not
predict dyadic deliberation outcomes). For a review, see Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman
Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm, 3 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV.
71, 78-79 (1979) (arguing that "[tihere are ample data available from several research
traditions in social psychology that indicate that individual and group decisions represent
fundamentally different phenomena" and reviewing relevant findings).
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aptly: "It is not clear whether we can even meaningfully speak of simulated
jurors without employing a group deliberation. Investigations of these
individual phenomena would be more appropriately referred to as studies of
individual judgment rather than of simulated jurors. '53
Perhaps the strongest empirical evidence demonstrating why individual
opinions should not be used as the sole predictor of group decisions stems
from research on juror bias. In recent decades, researchers have used the
mock jury experimental paradigm to demonstrate that a variety of defendant
and attorney characteristics (e.g., gender, race, and physical attractiveness)
can prejudice jurors' judgments.54 Some research has shown that biases
found in individual judgments can be attenuated by the deliberation process,
and that judgments tend to polarize in the direction favored by the evidence.
A mock jury experiment by Kaplan and Miller, for example, manipulated the
relative strength of the evidence as well as the degree of an extralegal
variable: the obnoxiousness of various trial participants. 55 The researchers
manipulated obnoxiousness by having mock lawyers and judges ask
redundant and irrelevant questions, discuss obscure points of law, or interrupt
the trial for a phone call.56 Although the obnoxiousness manipulations
significantly biased pre-deliberation guilt ratings, post-deliberation ratings
shifted in the direction of the initial strength of the evidence and were no
longer influenced by the extralegal variable. 57 Similarly, when Kerwin and
Shaffer investigated the biasing effects of inadmissible testimony they found
that "deliberations virtually eliminated [this kind of] bias among juries. '58 In
particular, their study showed that mock jurors who responded to a case by
deliberating and rendering a group verdict were more likely to follow judicial
instructions to ignore inadmissible testimony than mock jurors who
responded to the case by indicating individual opinions only. 59 Conversely,
53 Robert D. Foss, Group Decision Processes in the Simulated Trial Jury, 39
SOCIOMETRY 305, 305 n.l (1976).
54 MacCoun, supra note 47, at 303.
55 See generally Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror
Bias, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443 (1978) (third reported experiment found
extralegal sources of obnoxiousness having less influence on group verdicts than on
individual predeliberation judgments). When the weight of evidence does not clearly
favor one party over the other, it is especially perilous to attempt to predict jury outcomes
without relying on group-level data. See generally supra notes 46-47.
56 Kaplan & Miller, supra note 55, at 1451.
57 Id.
58 Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role
of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 160 (1994).
59 Id. at 159.
[Vol. 18:2 20031
IMPROVING SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
research by MacCoun and Kerr found that deliberations can sometimes
augment biases-they found evidence of a leniency bias that emerged during
group deliberations but not among participants who indicated individual
opinions in the absence of deliberations. 60 Together, these findings on bias
present a clear picture with respect to jury decisions: to understand jury
decisions one cannot rely on individual judgments alone. Rather, one must
study juries qua juries.
Certainly, individual-level data have some utility for understanding jury
behavior. Such data can, for example, be valuable for generally assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of a case from a layperson's perspective, or for
determining whether or not laypeople might vary in their opinions of which
party should prevail. Moreover, research has shown that the median of
individual liability ratings for cases does tend to correspond to how
deliberating juries decide those same cases with respect to liability. 61
Importantly, however, individual-level data on damages tend to be very poor
predictors of jury awards.62 Thus, whereas individual-level judgments might
be useful for predicting which party is apt to win or lose a case, they are not
reliable for predicting jury damages. Without an additional award predictor,
data from a summary jury on the issue of liability, even if reliable, would not
be sufficient for the purposes of arriving at a settlement agreement with
respect to a dollar award because a verdict of "liable" can correspond to
damages anywhere from one dollar, to some seemingly infinite amount.
Thus, although individual-level data can be valuable, these kinds of data
should be obtained in addition to, not instead of, group verdicts.
60 Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury
Deliberation: Jurors'Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 26-31
(1988) (experiment 2); see also MacCoun, supra note 47, at 303-14 (1990) (finding that
when trial evidence was equivocal, jury decisions following deliberations were more
lenient when the defendant was attractive than when the defendant was unattractive,
suggesting a bias based on physical appearance which was exacerbated by the
deliberation process); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L. Q., 235, 242 (1976)
(finding that inadmissible evidence influenced the verdicts of deliberating groups, but not
those of individual mockjurors).
61 Schkade, supra note 51, at 1153.
62 See id. (demonstrating that the median dollar awards of a group of individuals
prior to deliberation are poor predictors of that group's collective damage award
following deliberations).
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D. The Need for Correspondent Jury Size
A third problem that interferes with the ability of SJTs to predict
traditional jury outcomes arises when the size of a summary jury does not
match the size of the jury that would be impaneled for that case in a
traditional trial. Although most SJTs do impanel six jurors per jury, 63 which
would result in a match for most traditional civil juries, some judges impanel
fewer. For example, Judge John McNaught, U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, uses a five-person jury to ensure that the jury will
not return a tie verdict. 64 Other federal judges have convened SJTs with only
three jurors. 65 Therefore, even though traditional juries are very rarely
composed of fewer than six jurors, 66 summary juries sometimes are.
Psychological research strongly suggests that this "mismatch" in terms of
jury size can greatly hinder the SJT's ability to approximate the decisions of
traditional juries. Many studies have shown that when larger juries are
compared empirically to smaller juries, significant differences emerge.
Research has found, for example, that six-person juries tend to produce more
divergent (i.e., both higher and lower) damage judgments than twelve-person
juries even when the number of pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant verdicts is
roughly equivalent. 67 Research has also shown that reducing group size
63 See Woodley, supra note 24, at 572-73; Ponte supra note 8, at 1069 n.57; D.
MASS. R. 16.4(C)(3)(b) ("There shall be six jurors on the panel, unless the parties agree
otherwise."); N.D. OHIO R. 16:8 (c)(5) ("Size of Jury Panel. Usually the jury shall consist
of six (6) jurors.").
64 McNamara, supra note 45, at 469 n.60.
65 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES
73 n.184 (Federal Judicial Center 1986).
66 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236-45 (1978) (ruling that criminal juries of
less than six members violate the Sixth Amendment's representative requirement); FED.
R. Civ. P. 48 (which provides for juries "of not fewer than six and not more than twelve
members" for civil trials and allows juries of less than six only when the parties so
stipulate).
67 See, e.g., James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and Procedural Influence
on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards and Mock Civil
Juries, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 710-14 (1997) (finding that six-person
juries take less time to reach a verdict and award larger damages than twelve-person
juries but are also more variable in their awards); Dana Richard Katnik, Statistical
Analysis and Jury Size: Ballew v. State of Georgia, 56 DENY. L. J. 659, 670-71 (1979).
Not all research corroborates these findings. One study, for example, showed that twelve-
and six-member simulated juries did not differ significantly in terms of final group
decisions. B.A. Eakin, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Leadership Influence on
Decision Outcomes in Different Sized Jury Panels, 1I KANSAS J. SOCIOLOGY 109 (1975).
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increases the likelihood that the group will reach consensus (i.e., not hang). 68
Consequently, if reasonable jurors could differ in their evaluations of a given
case-a fact that would be useful for litigants who are considering settlement
to know-this information is less likely to surface from smaller juries. A
consensus that emerges from a small jury in such a case may be due to its
small size rather than because the evidence clearly favors one party.69
Consequently, parties who observe a summary jury reaching a unanimous
decision rather than hanging (as a larger jury might do for the same case)
might erroneously believe that the evidence clearly supports one party. In
such cases, this faulty conclusion might encourage the "losing" party to
settle. Although settlement is a primary purpose of SJTs, settlement under
such false pretenses is certainly less than ideal.
Although research comparing jury sizes has focused on differences
between juries of six and juries of twelve, these empirical studies are
nevertheless useful for comparing summary juries of five or fewer with juries
of six. The idea that the quality of decision processes or verdicts of five-
person juries might substantially differ from those of six-person juries was
accepted by the Supreme Court in Ballew v. Georgia,70 in which the Court
held that the minimum acceptable jury size for criminal trials was six. Even
though most of the research reviewed in Ballew contrasted six-person juries
with twelve-person juries, the Court recognized that significant differences
would exist between juries of five as compared to juries of six. The Court
reasoned that juries of less than six would be less likely to engage in
effective group deliberation and less able to produce accurate results. 71 For
example, the Court stated that:
Generally, a positive correlation exists between group size and the quality
of both group performance and group productivity. A variety of
explanations have been offered for this conclusion. Several are particularly
68 See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET. AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
409-10 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing the relevant literature); Michael J. Saks & Mollie
Weigher Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV.
451, 459-60 (1997) (reviewing the relevant literature and concluding that 12-person
juries hang less often than six-person juries).
69 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 46, at 105-10. The probability of getting
three people on a jury with the same viewpoint on the case is much easier than getting six
people with the same viewpoint. This is true according to the laws of chance and
probability alone, and can occur regardless of the strength of evidence that is presented.
70 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236-45.
71 Id. at 235 (reviewing psychological studies and concluding that psychological
research raises "significant doubts about the consistency and reliability of the decisions of
smaller juries").
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applicable in the jury setting. The smaller the group, the less likely are
members to make critical contributions necessary for the solution of a given
problem. Because... memory is important for accurate jury deliberations
[as] juries decrease in size ... they are less likely to have members who
remember each of the important pieces of evidence or argument. 72
To accurately approximate traditional jury outcomes, a summary jury
should not be smaller in size than the jury that would be used if the case were
to go to trial. If the jury is smaller, the case assessments resulting from the
SJT might provide a faulty basis on which litigants might base their
settlement decisions.
Clearly, those who support SJTs have assumed that they are reliable
predictors of traditional jury outcomes. 73 However, empirical research on
jury psychology suggests that these assumptions are suspect. To maximize
effectiveness in regards to prediction, SJTs should use multiple summary
juries, composed of the same number of jurors that would be empanelled on
a traditional jury in that jurisdiction, for that type of trial. Moreover, the
researchers should not simply calculate averages using the responses of
individual jurors; one should oblige the jurors to arrive at a group verdict
through deliberation. These insights from psychological research challenge
the intuition that SJTs in their current form can serve as "crystal balls" for
predicting what would happen in a traditional trial.
III. THE TREATMENT OF SUMMARY JURORS
Summary juries and the mock juries used by psychological researchers
share many similarities. Both are composed of lay citizens. Both expose
participants to a legal case and then gather data about their perceptions of the
case. Both summary juries and mock juries are used to test hypotheses-
litigants use summary juries to test hypotheses about the value and possible
success of their case; research psychologists use their participants to test their
hypotheses about jury behavior. Summary jurors and mock jurors also both
make non-binding decisions.
Despite the similarity between the two procedures, SJT administrators
treat their "participants" very differently from the way that psychologists
treat theirs. These differences are due in large part to the ethics code of the
72 Id. at 232-33.
73 See generally supra notes 34-37.
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American Psychological Association (APA).74 Under APA guidelines,
psychologists are required to obtain informed consent from their
participants. 75 They also adhere to strict rules about deceiving participants. 76
Violations of the ethics code are brought before the APA Standing Hearing
Panel, a hearing before which may result in reprimand, censure or expulsion
from the Association. 77 Many criticisms of the SJT can be succinctly
summarized by an analogy to psychological research and the corresponding
failure of courts to treat summary jurors with the degree of consideration and
respect that the APA requires of psychological researchers. These criticisms
would lose much of their force if those who organize SJTs treated summary
jurors more like psychologists treat their participants. This Part of the Article
addresses the problems with, and the solutions for, the two main criticisms
regarding the treatment of summary jurors: the use of deception and the lack
of informed consent.
A. Deception
Jurors are often misled as to their roles in SJTs. 78 Although their verdicts
are non-binding, jurors are usually led to believe the contrary. 79 Because
legal administrators believe that prospective "jurors who learn that their
decision is merely advisory will not be properly motivated to reach a just and
fair result, and, instead, will substitute compromise and time-saving devices
74 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT (1992), available at
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code.html.
75 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 6.11 Informed Consent to Research (1992),
available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/codel992.html#6.11. Under the informed consent
requirement, researchers obtain consent that is voluntarily provided by participants who
decide to participate in a study or task after being told what will be involved in
participation. ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 58 (1995).
76 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 6.15 Informed Consent to Research (1992),
available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code 1992.html#6.15.
77 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICS COMMITTEE RULES AND
PROCEDURES, available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/rules.html.
78 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS §§ 2.61
Summary Jury Trials (2d ed. Supp. 2001).
79 Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 372 (1986);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 802
n.74 (1998).
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for conscientious deliberation," 80 they typically do not inform summary
jurors of the advisory nature of their role until after they have returned their
verdicts.
Summary jury trials are sharply criticized for not informing jurors about
the advisory nature of their decisions. The critique is two-fold. First, not
informing summary jurors that their decisions are non-binding can be
detrimental to the summary jurors themselves because it may cause them
unnecessary stress. Avern Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, has documented the discomfort some summary jurors
have felt as a result of their participation, which includes sleep disturbances
and the type of anxiety that results from making one's own major life
decisions. 81 One juror even reported that the decisions she made on the jury
were among the "most difficult of her life." 82 Although these kinds of
negative consequences can result from participation in traditional trials as
well, when they do result from traditional trials they are not caused in part by
state-sanctioned deception. The same cannot be said for SJTs.
Avoiding negative consequences for participants is a chief concern of
research psychologists. The APA requires that psychologists minimize the
use of deception in research.83 Specifically, the APA's ethical rules state that:
Psychologists do not conduct a study involving deception unless they have
determined that the use of deceptive techniques is justified by the study's
prospective scientific, educational, or applied value and that equally
effective alternative procedures that do not use deception are not
feasible .... Psychologists never deceive research participants about
significant aspects that would affect their willingness to participate, such as
physical risks, discomfort, or unpleasant emotional experiences.84
Under some circumstances, testing a hypothesis can be accomplished
only if psychologists do not disclose certain aspects of the research to
prospective participants. Psychologists might engage in deceptive practices
when they need to combat demand characteristics and social desirability
biases while gathering information about socially important topics. 85 For
80 Bobby Marzine Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial, 63
TEMP. L. REV. 799, 809 (1990); see also Mulroy & Friedlander, supra note 13, at 564
(explaining that the jury is not told that their verdict is advisory until after the it has
returned).
81 Avern Cohn, Summary Jury Trial-A Caution, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 299, 300.
82 Id.
83 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 77.
84 Id.
85 SMITH & MACKIE, supra note 75, at 59.
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example, if a researcher told his or her research participants that the study
they were about to take part in concerned how racial prejudice affects
reactions to requests for help, people might be unable, even with the best of
intentions, to prevent their knowledge of the topic from affecting how they
react to such requests. 86 In such cases, informing participants of the true
nature of the study would invalidate the research findings. According to the
APA, the basic test for determining whether deception is acceptable is
whether the ends justify the means. 87 Psychologists tend to be "willing to use
deception as a last resort when they judge the research topic to be highly
important and when no other alternatives are feasible."88
The "ends" sought by SJTs--obtaining a decision resulting from
deliberation that is as serious as one would expect from a traditional jury
trial-do not justify the "means" of misleading the jurors as to the nature of
their advisory role. As discussed earlier, some legal commentators believe
that deception is necessary in order to obtain decisions that accurately
approximate those of traditional jurors who know they are making a binding
decision. 89 This argument rests on the assumption that individuals mandated
to make a decision that they believe will have real consequences for third
parties are more motivated in their decision-making processes, and make
different decisions, than individuals who know they are participating in a
simulation.
Several studies have found differences between decisions made under
"real" and simulated, or "hypothetical consequence," conditions. For
example, in a study by Wilson and Donnerstein, "real consequence"
participants were led to believe that their judgments would actually
determine what happened to the defendant, while "hypothetical
consequence" participants believed they were involved in a typical jury
decision-making study. 90 They found that the attractiveness of the
defendant's personality did not affect the guilt judgments by "real
consequence" participants, but it did affect judgments by "hypothetical
consequence" participants. 91 They also found that, compared to "hypothetical
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A
Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST, J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 213, 217 (1989) (reporting a comparison study of SJT use in Florida state
and federal program).
90 David W. Wilson & Edward Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the
"Simulated" Jury Paradigm, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1977).
91 Id. at 181-82.
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consequence" participants, "real, consequence" participants recalled more
evidence and were more likely to find the defendant guilty. 92 Several other
studies also found some significant differences between "real consequence"
and "hypothetical consequence" juror judgments. 93 Although such results
may appear to support the idea that jurors' perceptions of decision
consequences can significantly impact jury verdicts, one important aspect of
these studies' methods prevents this conclusion: the research participants did
not deliberate. 94 Consequently, such research provides little insight into
92 Id. at 185.
93 In one study, participants were told that the department chairman wanted to get
student input regarding the appropriate disciplinary action for a specific case of
plagiarism. David Suggs & John J. Berman, Factors Affecting Testimony about
Mitigating Circumstance and the Fixing of Punishment, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 251, 255
(1979). Participants were told that there was no guarantee that the student opinions would
be the deciding factor but were assured that their viewpoints would be carefully
considered. Id. at 254-55. Collapsing across all other manipulated variables (i.e.,
presence of mitigating testimony, source of the testimony, and credibility of the source),
no differences between the "no consequence" and "some consequence" conditions were
found for either of the main variables of interest-penalty or appraisal of penalty
severity. Id. at 257. But they did find that the pattern of results for some of these variables
(i.e., presence of mitigating testimony, source of the testimony, and credibility of the
source) was affected by the consequence manipulation: namely, participants who thought
their decisions were of real consequence gave less severe penalties when mitigating
evidence was presented as opposed to when it was not. Id. at 258. Moreover, among
participants whose decisions had no real consequence, none of these variables produced
any reliable difference. Id. In another study, students were either led to believe that their
judgments were real and binding or were told they would be participating in a simulation.
Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others Can
Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 3 (1986). They were asked by a
professor to provide guidance on a case concerning a fellow student who was suspected
of cheating. Id. at 7. They were told that the majority vote on the student's guilt would be
honored by the department. Id. This study found that the consequence manipulations had
no effect on convictions when evidence was highly incriminating, but that it did have an
effect when evidence was mildly incriminating. Id. at 8. In particular, real consequence
participants were more likely to convict and were more certain of the defendant's guilt.
Id.
94 To my knowledge, only three studies that examined differences between "real
consequence" and "hypothetical consequence" judgments included deliberations. One
study found no differences between the proportion of first-ballot guilty votes in real juries
(whose decisions carried real consequences for the litigants) and shadow juries composed
of individuals who had been excused during voir dire for the same cases (whose decisions
clearly carried no real consequences). Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect
of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District
Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 512-13 (1978). The study did not provide comparisons of
group verdicts, however, and thus has little utility for clarifying how differences in
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whether summary jurors who deliberate might behave differently if they
were told that their decisions would be advisory in nature as opposed to
being led to believe that they would have real consequences for the parties.95
By contrast, research that has included group deliberations suggests that
mock jurors take their advisory role quite seriously even when they know
that their decisions will not be binding on a real litigant.96 For example, Kerr
and his colleagues found that individual predeliberation opinions and
sentences, group verdicts, deliberation time, number of polls, and individual
juror's memory for case-related facts and their criteria for reasonable doubt
were not significantly affected by their role manipulation. 97 Moreover, an
perceived decision consequences affect group outcomes. A second study found
differences between actual trial outcomes and individual mock juror judgments of the
same case. Gordon Bermant, et al., The Logic of Simulation in Jury Research, I CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 224, 229-311 (1974). It too did not report analyses at the group-level,
and therefore provides very limited information about the behavior of juries. A third
study, which did report group-level analyses, compared mock jurors (led to believe they
were participating in a psychological experiment) and "actual" jurors (led to believe they
were helping to decide a real case for a university committee on student discipline).
Norbert Kerr, David R. Nerenz & David Herrick, Role Playing and the Study of Jury
Behavior, 7 SOC. METHODS & RES. 337, 343 (1979). This study found no significant
differences between the "actual" and mock jurors or juries with respect to group verdicts,
sentence recommendations, deliberation duration, or the decision schemes used during
deliberations. Id. at 351.
95 See supra Part II (discussing the importance of including deliberations in research
that aims at predicting jury decisions).
96 REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 37-58 (1983) (arguing that experiments
using mock juries can be made sufficiently realistic to yield reliable predictions about the
behavior of real juries); Ponte supra note 8, at 1084 n. 114.
Several studies have examined the level of emotional involvement of mock
jurors who are aware of the hypothetical nature of their deliberations. The
studies report that mock jury verdicts may be highly predictive of actual trial
verdicts and that mock jurors show a high degree of emotional involvement in
their work.
Id. (quoting Bobby M. Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial, 63
TEMP. L. REv. 799, 809 (1990)); see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and
Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561, 567 (1997) (reviewing
research suggesting that concerns about differences in motivation between "real" and
simulated juries may be overstated because factors that affect decision-making are not
always affected by motivation levels); supra note 94.
97 Norbert L. Kerr et al., Role-Playing and the Study of Jury Behavior, 7 Soc.
METHODS & RES. 337, 350-52 (1979). But see Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman
Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
71, 82-83 (1979) (arguing that the Wilson & Donnerstein (1977) and Kerr et al. (1979)
studies did not have an actual "real" consequence condition because they relied on
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ambitious meta-analysis that evaluated twenty years of jury research in Law
and Human Behavior-both experimental studies and field research on
actual jurors-concluded that mock jurors do not behave appreciably
differently from the way real jurors do. 98 These findings challenge the belief
that being open with jurors may lessen juror attention and the seriousness of
deliberations.
Moreover, the success of the trial consulting industry also challenges the
notion that being open with summary jurors would limit the utility of their
deliberations. When trial consultants conduct mock trial or focus group
proceedings for a party to a dispute, they typically inform their mock jurors
that their decisions, rather than binding the parties to a particular outcome,
will be used to gain an understanding of how real jurors would perceive the
case.99 Thus, the advisory nature of their decisions is made clear. The
reported utility of the data from such sessions in terms of understanding the
case and predicting outcomes suggests that obtaining valid information
without deceiving participants about the nature of their role is in fact quite
feasible. 100
"convincing college students in a laboratory situation that their decisions had real
consequences"); Saks & Marti, supra note 68, at 454 (arguing that because of the lack of
realistic conditions, no ideal studies have been conducted involving how jury size affects
a trial).
98 Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still
Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 88 (1999).
99 Parties to a dispute often hire trial consultants to conduct mock trial proceedings
before a group of laypeople who are representative of the jury pool in the venue where
the trial would be held. Because using such consultants typically takes place as part of the
adversarial process, rather than having both parties formally represented at the
proceedings, the lawyers of the party who hired the consultants prepare abbreviated
versions of both parties' arguments and evidence presentation. To prevent the mock
jurors from being biased in their opinions, the participants are usually not told which
party hired the consultants until after the proceedings. See generally Franklin Strier &
Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession,
its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, To Do About It, 1999 WisC. L. REV.
441; Franklin Strier, Paying the Piper: Proposed Reforms of the Increasingly Bountiful
but Controversial Profession of Trial Consulting, 44 S.D. L. REv. 699 (1999).
100 See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 99, at 464 (1999) (describing indicators of
trial consulting success); Mary Helen Yarborough, Lawyers Turn To Jury Consultants,
HR Focus, Feb. 1996, at 9 (stating that Litigation Sciences Inc. claims a ninety-six
percent accuracy rate in predicting the outcome of a case); see generally Dennis P. Stolle,
et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical
Investigation, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 139, 143-47 (1996) (reviewing empirical
evidence on the efficacy of consulting).
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A second reason why SJTs have been sharply criticized for deceiving
jurors is that such deception can be detrimental to the legal system. Judge
Posner has questioned the ethics of this type of deception:
Never telling the jury worries me .... Telling the jurors. after they have
delivered the summary verdict that the verdict is not legally binding is only
a partial anodyne for my concern .... The jurors are still being fooled; and
they are learning that juries sometimes make decisions and at other times
simply referee fake trials. As word spreads, the conscientiousness of jurors
could decline; it is almost a detail that the utility of the summary jury trial
would also decline.101
Indeed, if the general public becomes aware that "some jurors are being
fooled into thinking they are deciding cases when they are not, it could
undermine the jury system."'10 2 Research on procedural justice has shown the
importance of the public's perception of the legal system in terms of
promoting adherence to the law. 103 If the public accepts the idea that jurors
are being "lied to" when participating in SJTs, the legal system might be
irreparably harmed.
The rules strictly limiting deception in psychology are important in that
they help to protect the reputation of the discipline, and to prevent
researchers from inadvertently discouraging individuals from wanting to
participate in research. Courts should follow this example by strictly limiting
the use of deception in SJTs. Judges should tell summary jurors precisely the
truth-that their judgments can provide the parties with a better and more
realistic idea of what jurors would think of their case, and that such
information often makes parties more willing to settle out of court by using
the SJT verdict as a source of information as to what kind of settlement
would be reasonable. That is, even though their decisions are advisory rather
than binding, they do indeed have consequences for the parties because the
parties will consider them when they decide whether to settle, and, if so, for
how much. In fact, their verdict may end up being the exact terms of the
settlement agreement. When they tell jurors about their advisory role, judges
should also stress the importance of summary juries in the legal system:
101 Posner, supra note 79, at 386-87.
102 Id. at 386. Even if the judge, at the end of the trial, describes the deception as a
"necessary" tool in an attempt to maximize the approximation to a real jury trial, the
initial deception is a significant liability to the legal system.
103 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (drawing a
causal connection between perceptions of fairness, judgments of legitimacy, and future
compliance with the law).
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Judges should inform jurors that their efforts to render fair, advisory SJT
verdicts may help to speed up case processing, decrease court backlogs, and
reduce party and court time and costs. Jurors, as taxpayers, are concerned
about court costs and, as seekers of justice, are concerned about fairness and
efficiency in case processing. If properly informed about the benefits of
their advisory verdict, jurors will be more likely to appreciate the
seriousness and importance of their role.104
Informing the summary jurors honestly about their role would help to protect
the reputation of both the traditional and summary jury trial systems, with
little sacrifice in how seriously summary juries deliberate.
B. Informed Consent
Another lesson that SJT administrators can learn from psychologists is
the importance of obtaining informed consent. In psychology, the doctrine of
informed consent requires all participants, whether research participants or
the recipients of services, to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily consent
to psychological procedures. 10 5 Judges could follow suit by informing jurors
of the exact nature of their role at the start of the process.
The idea of informed consent would also require that summary judgment
service be voluntary. Summary jurors would be willing volunteers-either
paid or unpaid. Obtaining informed consent and making service voluntary
would weaken the constitutional arguments against SJTs. These arguments
hold that judges do not have the authority to convene a jury merely to assist
the settlement process. 106 For example, in Hume v. M & C Mgmt., 10 7 the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that federal judges do
not have the authority to mandate SJTs. The court reasoned that nothing in
the Jury Selection and Service Act108 required citizens to serve on juries for
SJTs. 109 It held that federal judges "have no authority to summon citizens to
serve as settlement advisors, just as they would have no authority to summon
citizens to serve as hand servants for themselves, lawyers, or litigants."' 10
104 Ponte, supra note 8, at 1097.
105 Diana Baumrind, Some Thoughts on Ethics of Research: After Reading
Milgram 's "Behavioral Study of Obedience," 19 AM. PSYCHOL. 421, 422 (1964).
106 See Connolly, supra note 30, at 1457; Moore, supra note 42, at 515-16. For a
useful discussion of judicial power to mandate the SJT, see Webber, supra note 8.
107 Hume v. M & C Mgmt., 129 F.R.D. 506, 508-09 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
108 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
109 See Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508-09.
110 See id. at 510.
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Some legal commentators have criticized the idea of using volunteer,
privately paid, jurors. As one commentator has argued:
Such a development would likely spell the death of the summary jury trial
in federal court. There would be no real economic advantage to electing the
SJT over a regular trial. There would also be many procedural problems
arising from private parties trying to draw a jury, such as how to ensure that
a random sample of the potential jurors is drawn even when some of them
do, not respond to requests to serve or refuse to participate once
contacted. 11
But a close analysis of what a voluntary program might look like
suggests that a voluntary program might reach the same end as a mandatory
one. 112 A court could select summary jurors from those who have been part
of the venire, but were not chosen for jury service. 113 Those who appear for
voir dire have probably already made plans to set aside their day to
participate in the legal system. 114 As one commentator has argued:
[Those who have not been chosen for service] have [already] been paid and
recognized as qualified jurors. With the proper appeal, a judge might
convince many in the panel to volunteer to serve on the summary jury. Even
if some jurors decline to serve, their absence would not defeat the
advantages of the SJT. After all, the summary jury would still consist of
citizens who have been drawn at random, although the opting out of certain
jurors jeopardizes the randomness to a certain extent. Even so, since the
decision of the summary jurors is not binding on the parties or the court, the
need for a scientifically random sample of citizens compelled into service is
not nearly as strong. 115
As Judge Connolly, a district court judge from Minnesota, has suggested,
"the clerk of court [could] ask prospective jurors if they would be interested
in serving on a condensed case that would probably only last one to two
days.",116 In doing so in his own court, he has received many volunteers.1 17 If
111 Charles W. Hatfield, The Summary Jury Trial: Who Will Speak for the Jurors?,
1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 151, 157.
112 Id. at 159.
113 Id.
114Id.
115 Id. The voir dire process ensures that even individuals who end up serving on
real juries are not randomly selected from the community. During this process, some
venire candidates may be excused by the court, others still are removed from the panel as
a result of for-cause challenges or peremptory strikes.
116 Connolly, supra note 30, at 1458.
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a judge approaches those who have been dismissed from regular jury service
and frames SJT service as an opportunity to learn about the legal system,
provide non-binding suggestions to their fellow citizens, and help reduce
crowded dockets which their tax money maintains, volunteer SJT service
could become quite feasible.
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of SJTs from a research psychological perspective has been
long overdue, and the insights are significant. First, SJTs should use multiple
panels. Second, summary jurors should deliberate in order to provide group-
level case evaluations. Third, the jury size used in a given SJT should match
that which would be used in a traditional jury trial for that type of case, in
that particular venue. Rather than relying on their own intuitions, judges
should apply the empirical findings about jury behavior to guide and
structure SJTs. Doing so would enhance the ability of SJTs to predict
traditional jury outcomes and provide litigants with more valid information
upon which to rest their settlement decisions.
We should challenge SJT administrators to incorporate the lessons
described in this Article and to systematically study the resulting "modified"
SJTs. A study using random case assignment, similar to the one conducted in
Ramsey County,118 would be useful for comparing current (unmodified)
SJTs, modified SJTs, and traditional jury outcomes for similar kinds of cases
in similar venues.1 19 Such a test would likely find the outcomes of modified
SJTs to have significantly greater similarity to traditional jury outcomes
when compared to outcomes of unmodified SJTs. This prediction rests on the
fact that summary juries formed by the guidelines proposed herein would be
structured much more like traditional juries. As part of such a study, lawyers,
litigants, and summary jurors should be asked to rate their perceptions of SJT
effectiveness, legitimacy, and overall fairness. Summary jury trials that
implement the guidelines discussed herein should prove to be more
successful in terms of these types of criteria.
These modified SJTs, however, would not necessarily produce higher
settlement rates than unmodified SJTs because the current (unmodified)
system for conducting SJTs can lead to settlements under "false
pretenses." 120 That is, juries of less than six (currently common in SJTs) can
117 See id.
118 See supra notes 25-29.
119 The unmodified form of SJTs used in such a study should be in the format used
by Lambros, since this format is most common. See supra Part I.120 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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inadvertently inflate the perception that the evidence is unequivocal, which
may in turn promote settlement in cases that would not seem so "one-sided"
when reviewed by a larger jury. Modified SJTs would, however, increase the
validity or "correctness" of settlement decisions. Because of this increase in
accuracy, even currently skeptical legal practitioners and members of the
public might come to accept SJTs as sufficiently reliable predictors of jury
trial outcomes. This increased acceptance might lead to increased settlement
rates over the long-run.
This Article also discussed insights from psychology with respect to the
treatment of summary jurors. One implication of the research and ethical
considerations reviewed herein is that SJT administrators should develop
ethical norms that require obtaining informed consent from participants.
They should also strictly limit the use of deception. Empirical research
suggests that any "benefit" derived from misleading summary jurors as to the
advisory nature of their decisions is inconsequential, and, moreover, does not
outweigh the potential cost to the legal system's reputation. The legal system
should be very wary of encouraging the perception that it misleads citizens
about jury duty or that it uses people as settlement advisors-a civic duty not
widely promulgated or provided for explicitly by any law-without their
informed consent. If SJT administrators were to adopt and follow guidelines
similar to the APA rules concerning deception and informed consent, much
of the legal criticism regarding SJTs would lose force.
Overall, SJTs are a very promising form of ADR. They deserve our
careful consideration and thoughtful suggestions for improvement. With
some procedural modifications, like those proposed herein, SJTs might
provide litigants with very valuable information that they can use to make
settlement decisions. In their current form, however, SJTs often fall
significantly short of their potential and risk tainting public perceptions of the
legal system in general, and of ADR more specifically.
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